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 1 
The threshold lies in the method: instructing jurors about reasoning beyond 
reasonable doubt 
 
Federico Picinali 
 
Abstract 
The last few decades have seen several scholars and courts striving to understand the meaning of the 
reasonable doubt standard and, in particular, to produce instructions that would enlighten jurors in this 
regard. The focus has been on defining the standard as a threshold indicating the quality and quantity of 
evidence sufficient for a finding of fact, or the degree of confidence that the fact finder should have before 
convicting. The results of these endeavours have not been satisfactory and nowadays it is still frequent 
that juries ask the court for clarification on the meaning of the standard. The paper argues that the 
reasonable doubt standard is better conceived and explained to the jury as requiring a particular method 
of reasoning, rather than merely a threshold. A direct explanation of the threshold is elusive and 
potentially encroaches on the fact finder’s role. Reference to a method of reasoning, instead, promises to 
provide useful directions to the jury, which promote compliance with the threshold itself. The paper 
advances methodological directives inspired by works in philosophy of the mind and virtue 
epistemology. The paper then concludes with practical recommendations for devising a new instruction 
on the standard of proof. 
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1.Introduction 
The Crown Court Benchbook notwithstanding,1 English jurors are often instructed that 
the beyond reasonable doubt standard (BRD) is the standard of proof for criminal trials. 
It is common for Crown Court judges to mention BRD immediately after imparting the 
                                                        
 Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am indebted to Mike Redmayne, 
Jules Holroyd, and Anna Ichino for their valuable comments. A previous draft of the paper was presented 
at the Society of Legal Scholars Annual Conference held at the University of Nottingham in September 
2014. 
1 Section 4.3 advises judges to instruct jurors that they must be sure of the defendant’s guilt in order to 
convict. See Judicial Studies Board (now Judicial College) Crown Court Benchbook: Directing the Jury (2010) 
at 16, available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/crown-court-bench-book-directing-the-jury-2/ 
(last viewed 8 August 2014). 
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‘being sure of guilt’ instruction, suggested by the Benchbook.2 Alternatively, judges may 
mention BRD at a later stage, in response to a request for clarification from the jury on 
the meaning of ‘being sure’.3 Archbold’s support for BRD over ‘being sure of guilt’ is 
further indication that the standard is not going to disappear anytime soon from English 
courtrooms.4 
There is, however, a conspicuous body of evidence showing that lay people struggle to 
come to grips with the meaning of BRD. It is not uncommon that jurors, after retiring in 
the jury room, send notes to the judge asking for clarification on this standard.5 Also, a 
series of empirical studies conducted in the USA6 has shown that in the absence of a 
definition of BRD mock jurors find it hard to apply the standard; that they match BRD 
with probability thresholds that are unacceptably low;7 and that there is substantial 
variation in the probability thresholds selected by different mock jurors. The confusion 
and disagreement among mock jurors echoes the scholarly debate on the question as to 
what is the most accurate and effective definition of BRD – which is strictly connected to 
the debate on whether the trial judge should give a definition of the standard at all.8 Not 
                                                        
2 See M. Zander, “The Criminal Standard of Proof: How Sure is Sure?” (2000) 150 N. L. J. 1517. See also R. 
v Stephens [2002] EWCA Crim 1529; 2002 WL 1039755. 
3 Indeed, the Benchbook itself resorts to BRD to clarify the meaning of ‘being sure’. 
4 See Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (2014), Ch. 4, s 447. Cf. P. Roberts & A. Zuckerman, 
Criminal Evidence (OUP, 2010) at 255. 
5 See Stephens, supra note 2; R. v Majid [2009] EWCA Crim 2563; 2009 WL 3122440; R. v Folley [2013] EWCA 
Crim 396; 2013 WL 617952. 
6 See R. J. Simon and L. Mahan, “Quantifying Burdens of Proof. A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the 
Classroom” (1971) 5 Law and Society Review 319 at 325–329; D. U. Strawn & R. W. Buchanan, “Jury 
Confusion: A Threat to Justice” (1976) 59 Judicature 478 at 481; N. L. Kerr, R. S. Atkin, G. Stasser, D. Meek, 
R. W. Holt, J. H. Davis, “Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned 
Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors” (1976) 34 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
282 at 291; E. Lillquist, ‘Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability’ 
(2002) 36 UC Davis Law Review 85 at 111-117. 
7 Cf. Zander, supra note 2. 
8 See H. A. Diamond, “Reasonable Doubt: to Define or not to Define” (1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 
1716; Note, “Reasonable Doubt: an Argument Against Definition” (1995) 108 Harvard Law Review 1955; I. 
A. Horowitz, “Reasonable Doubt Instructions. Commonsense Justice and Standard of Proof” (1997) 3 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 285; E. Stoffelmayr & S. S. Diamond, “The Conflict Between Precision 
and Flexibility in Explaining ‘Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’” (2000) 6 Journal of Psychology, Public Policy, 
and Law 769; L. M. Solan, “Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About 
Reasonable Doubt” (1999) 78 Texas Law Review 105; L. M. Solan, “Convicting the Innocent Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt: Some Lessons About Jury Instructions from the Sheppard Case” (2001) 49 Cleveland 
 3 
surprisingly, lack of consensus on the definition of BRD is also widespread amongst 
academics. Courts too have been unable to work out a shared understanding of the 
formula.9 
In order to sidestep the definitional problem it has been suggested that trial judges 
instruct jurors on BRD but do not volunteer an explanation of the standard, unless the 
jury asks for it. In such a case only a concise definition should be given.10 This halfway 
house is reminiscent of Jon Newman’s disappointment when realising that “we are using 
a formulation that we believe will become less clear the more we explain it.”11 A more 
radical proposal is that advanced by the Benchbook: to replace BRD with a different – 
albeit allegedly equally stringent – standard of proof.12 The paper contends that these are 
not the only available – nor the best – avenues. It is possible and advisable both to retain 
BRD and to provide jurors with an intelligible and useful instruction on its meaning. In 
order to do so, however, we must shift focus from the evidential threshold represented 
by the standard to the method of reasoning that it demands. Most of the definitional 
attempts conducted so far have conceptualised the standard as a threshold indicating the 
amount and the quality of evidence required for conviction, or the degree of confidence 
that the fact finder must have in the hypothesis of guilt before convicting. This narrow 
focus is the main reason for their failure to produce intelligible and practicable 
instructions. The standard, instead, may be understood as demanding also a certain 
method of reasoning from the fact finder; in particular, a method that aims at ensuring 
that the relevant evidential threshold is respected. As will be shown, this understanding 
                                                                                                                                                                        
State Law Review 465; P. Tillers & J. Gottfried, “Case Comment—United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 
275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim that Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Is 
Unquantifiable?” (2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 135; J. Franklin, “Case Comment—United States v. 
Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): Quantification of the ‘Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ 
Standard” (2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 159; J. B. Weinstein & I. Dewsbury, “Comment on the 
Meaning of ‘Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’” (2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 167. 
9 See, in particular, L. Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology (CUP, 2006) at 
32-51 and Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 4 at 253-254. 
10 See Archbold, supra note 4, s 447(f). The suggested concise definition is: “a reasonable doubt is the sort of 
doubt that might affect the mind of a person in dealing with matters of importance in his own affairs.” 
11 Jon O. Newman, “Beyond ‘Reasonable Doubt’” (1993) 68 New York University Law Review 979 at 984. 
12 See also R. v Summers [1952] 1 All E.R. 1059 CCA; 36 Cr. App. R 14. 
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creates new scope for an instruction that would make a valuable contribution to jurors’ 
ability to perform their task. 
 
 
2.Beyond reasonable doubt as an evidential threshold 
In an oft-quoted dictum Lord Denning elaborated on the meaning of BRD in the following 
terms:  
 
[Proof of guilt] need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond 
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of doubt. The law would fail to protect the 
community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong 
against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence 
‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but 
nothing short of that will suffice.13 
 
This is just one of the many judicial attempts to define BRD, but it serves better than 
others to illustrate the difficulty of explaining to jurors what the standard requires. The 
obvious goal of the passage is to identify a threshold indicating the amount and quality 
of evidence that is necessary for conviction. In order to achieve this, Lord Denning 
employs a variety of expressions: ‘need not reach certainty’, ‘high degree of probability’, 
‘fanciful possibilities’, ‘so strong’, ‘remote possibility’, ‘not in the least probable’. All of 
these phrases are there to flesh out the notoriously hazy concept of ‘reasonableness’, 
which plays the crucial role of distinguishing between the doubts that are fatal to the 
prosecution case and those that are not. The result, however, is not satisfactory: no light 
is shed on the threshold represented by BRD. Instead, the expressions used by Denning 
are themselves in need of clarification – possibly more so than the concept of 
‘reasonableness’, thus producing the disappointing regress hinted at by Newman. 
Some may argue that failure to communicate precisely to jurors the threshold 
represented by BRD is not such a bad thing, provided that the fact finder understands 
                                                        
13 Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All E.R. 372 at 373-374; [1947] W.N. 241. 
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that such threshold is sufficiently high (i.e., higher than the ‘preponderance of the 
evidence’ but falling short of certainty). In a seminal paper Laurence Tribe pointed out 
the advantages of having an imprecise standard of proof.14 A clear-cut threshold spells 
out explicitly that innocent people may be convicted, provided that the prosecution 
establishes a strong enough case against them. Tribe argues that the cost of making this 
information available to the jury, and the public in general, is too high to accept. I do not 
intend to take a position on this issue. However, we must acknowledge that while 
imprecision may have its value, when it becomes such that the fact finder herself 
considers it a hindrance to her job – as when jurors repeatedly ask for clarification on the 
standard – something has gone amiss.  
The difficulty with instructing jurors on the threshold represented by BRD does not 
seem to lie in giving a definition of the key concept of ‘reasonableness’ – thus, a 
definition of the threshold itself. In a previous paper15 I have attempted to clarify the 
semantics of the concept, i.e., the conditions for its application. Whether my proposal is 
convincing or not, I hope at least to have shown that clarifying what reasonableness 
means is not an intractable task. The real problem, however, is that while it is possible to 
identify in the abstract the conditions for the application of the concept, in the absence of 
a specific reference by the judge to the facts of the case, this abstract identification does 
not afford sufficient guidance to the fact finder. This is due to what I called the ‘buck-
passing’ nature of reasonableness – a feature that, I believe, a successful definition of the 
term should try to unpack.16 Let me explain this point briefly. Reasonableness is the 
property of certain statements or lines of reasoning, which refers to the presence of 
reasons in their support – these reasons being the condition for the accuracy of a claim to 
the effect that a statement or line of reasoning is ‘reasonable’. Importantly, claiming that 
a statement is reasonable does not yet specify what the reasons in its support are: 
                                                        
14 See L. H. Tribe, “Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process” (1971) 84 Harvard 
Law Review 1329, in particular, at 1372-1375. 
15 See F. Picinali, “Two Meanings of ‘Reasonableness’: Dispelling the ‘Floating’ Reasonable Doubt” (2013) 
76 Modern Law Review 845. 
16 See id. at 857 ff.   
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identifying these reasons requires that we look at the facts backing the statement. The 
upshot is that a judge could easily define the concept of ‘reasonable doubt’ by saying, 
roughly, that it is an assertion supported by reasons.17 In fact, some judicial definitions of 
BRD go along these lines.18 However, in order to give more complete guidance to the 
jury, the judge would have to indicate – even if by way of a single example – what facts 
(or gaps) of the case at issue may or may not constitute relevant reasons to doubt guilt. 
E.g., whether the failure of one of several eyewitnesses to identify the defendant is a 
reason to doubt guilt; whether the unavailability of DNA evidence in a rape case 
constitutes such a reason. It goes without saying that this indication would encroach on 
the role of the fact finder and would create the risk of unduly influencing the verdict. 
True, the judge may tell the jury a fictional story, concoct some facts and then use them to 
clarify the notion of ‘reasonable doubt’. However, because of the difference between the 
hypothetical and the real case, this technique may turn out to be utterly unhelpful. Also, 
to the extent that the hypothetical is crafted in such way that it is sufficiently similar to 
the case at issue, the problems of interference and of undue influence would again 
present themselves. So, it seems that either the judge may cling to the abstract definition 
and give no guidance or she may offer some relevant examples thus running the risk of 
giving too much guidance.  
I believe that there is a more promising strategy to follow. This strategy requires that 
we conceive of the standard as demanding a particular method of reasoning from the fact 
finder, rather than merely setting an evidential threshold. Importantly, the method 
would be such that adherence to it would promote respect for the threshold itself. If we 
read this additional requirement into the standard, we can then concentrate on defining 
what the relevant method of reasoning is, so as to provide useful directions to jurors on 
how to discharge their duty. This task promises to be more manageable and more 
                                                        
17 I concede that this definition is rough. However, as far as my understanding of ‘reasonableness’ goes, it 
is correct. To become more precise it would need to be enriched with further important details about the 
notions of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘reason’, as explained in id. Alas, the definition would still produce the 
problem discussed in this section. 
18 See Laudan, supra note 9 at 40-41 and Archbold, supra note 4, s 447(f). 
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respectful of the division of labour between the judge and the jury than the task of 
communicating the evidential threshold represented by BRD.  
 
 
3.Reasoning beyond reasonable doubt 
In his stern critique of the BRD instructions produced by the US case law, Larry Laudan 
notes: “[o]ne reason that the various characterizations of [BRD] we have surveyed seem 
so vacuous or unsatisfactory is that they studiously avoid talking about the structure of 
proof or about the kind of case the prosecution must present…[They fail to acknowledge] 
that persuasion is a process of reasoning through evidence. Judges gives [sic] jurors few 
hints as to how they should do that.”19 This passage goes straight to the point I am 
making. What is missing from the judicial definitions of BRD that have become familiar 
to scholars and practitioners is the reference to a method to engage with the evidence 
presented at trial.  
The claim that it is possible to read such method into the criminal standard of proof is 
not a new one: Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman have argued that “[f]rom the fact 
finder’s perspective, the asymmetrical ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ standard may 
function, not so much as a subjective measure of confidence in a particular conclusion, 
but as a procedure for reasoning about evidence”.20 Roberts and Zuckerman contend that 
this reasoning procedure is the Holmesian21 method of eliminative induction: given a 
certain fact in need of explanation, a series of explanatory hypotheses are formulated and 
progressively discarded so as to select one of them only, namely, the most robust.22  
                                                        
19 Laudan, supra note 9 at 52 (emphasis in the original). 
20 Roberts & Zuckerman, supra note 4 at 258. Cf. H. L. Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law (OUP, 2008), Ch. 4, 
arguing that a standard of proof, rather than representing a decisional threshold, requires that the fact 
finder adopt caution as a deliberative attitude. See also F. M. Iacoviello, “Lo Standard Probatorio dell’al di 
là di Ogni Ragionevole Dubbio e il Suo Controllo in Cassazione” (2006) Cassazione Penale 3869. 
21 The reference is to the celebrated fictional detective Sherlock Holmes. 
22 For a good treatment of this method of reasoning and of its possible forensic applications see C. Pizzi, 
Diritto, Abduzione e Prova (Giuffré, 2009). See also J. R. Josephson & M. C. Tanner, “Conceptual Analysis of 
Abduction” in J. R. Josephson & S. G. Josephson (eds), Abductive Inference: Computation, Philosophy, 
Technology (CUP, 1996). 
 8 
While eliminative induction is certainly a valuable reasoning method and fact finders 
are likely to benefit from using it, the definition and explanation of this reasoning 
procedure seem to present similar problems to those discussed in the previous section. 
How is the jury to decide whether a certain hypothesis must be discarded? When should 
eliminative reasoning come to an end? If we do not provide the fact finder with an 
answer to these questions, the guidance that we offer is very limited. And yet, in order to 
answer these questions we must again address the problem of explaining to the jury the 
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable doubt: simply telling jurors that the 
hypothesis of the prosecutor should be discarded if a defensive hypothesis supported by 
reasons is available would not do; however, indicating what facts of the real case may or 
may not constitute or corroborate a reasonable defensive hypothesis would be doing too 
much. E.g., consider the case of a defendant on trial for rape, where the prosecution case 
rests entirely on DNA evidence and all the other evidence points towards innocence.  In 
particular, the victim did not pick the defendant out at an identity parade.23 In explaining 
what a reasonable defensive hypothesis is, it would be inappropriate for the judge to say 
that lack of identification would (or would not) be sufficient to render the hypothesis of 
innocence reasonable. 
As suggested by Roberts and Zuckerman, interpreting BRD as requiring a reasoning 
method is a feasible and fruitful strategy. However, if the reasoning method read into the 
standard is such that its definition and, in particular, its communication demand that we 
elucidate the concluding phase of fact finding, the strategy is of little help. This is because 
until we have solved the problem of explaining to the jurors the threshold represented by 
BRD, we are unable to offer them valuable instructions. My claim is that it is possible to 
read into the standard certain methodological directives that, on the one hand, are 
specific and substantial enough to provide useful guidance to the fact finder and, on the 
other hand, are intelligible even if not accompanied by an elucidation of the concluding 
phase of fact finding. These directives prescribe the endorsement and the practice of a 
                                                        
23 Cf. the facts in Adams [1996] 2 Cr. App. R. 467; Adams (No. 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377. 
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certain epistemic virtue, a cognitive faculty that someone engaging in an enterprise such 
as criminal fact finding should employ. Some virtue epistemologists claim that “an 
epistemic virtue should be the kind of trait whose most characteristic expression is the 
formation of a justified belief” and the achievement of knowledge.24 In a similar vein I 
contend that the particular epistemic virtue that BRD prescribes is a cognitive faculty 
whose characteristic expression is promoting respect for the threshold embedded in BRD. 
 
 
4.Exercising authority over our beliefs 
In an interesting book on self-knowledge Richard Moran distinguishes between what he 
calls a ‘theoretical’ and a ‘deliberative’ stance towards our beliefs – more precisely, 
towards the question ‘do I believe that p?’25 The theoretical stance has a potentially 
pathological character in that it involves some kind of dissociation within the individual. 
In addressing the question ‘do I believe that p?’ the individual relates to herself in the 
same way in which she would relate to other people when addressing the question as to 
what they believe. She answers relying on evidence about herself (her thoughts and 
behaviour) as if she were observing herself from an external vantage point. She is totally 
disengaged from the object and the accuracy of her beliefs: she is merely concerned with 
the presence of the cognitive attitude, not with the presence of reasons that justify having 
it. If the attitude is present, the question is answered in the affirmative. Full stop. 
Addressed from a deliberative stance, instead, the question ‘do I believe that p?’ 
acquires a very different meaning. Here, in deciding whether she believes that p, the 
individual deliberates on whether she is to believe or not. In other words, she makes up her 
mind, rather than merely describing its content. The evidence that the individual heeds 
when deliberating on her beliefs is not evidence about herself. It is evidence about the 
                                                        
24  R. Audi, “Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief” in A. Fairweather & L. Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue 
Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (OUP, 2001) at 95 (emphasis in the original).  
25 See R. Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2001) 
at 55-60. The same alternative applies to questions concerning our intentions. See also S. Hampshire & H. 
L. A. Hart, “Decision, Intention, and Certainty” (1958) 67 Mind 1 at 2, 10. 
 10 
very object of the belief, that is, about p: the reasons that she takes as relevant to 
determine what she believes are just the same reasons that she would take as relevant to 
determine whether the object of her belief is true. In other words, the individual treats 
the question ‘do I believe that p?’ as equivalent to the question ‘is p true?’ 26 Therefore, she 
is concerned with forming a cognitive attitude that is accurate. 
Through adopting the deliberative stance we exercise authority over our beliefs,27 because 
we treat them as attitudes that we constitute via our reasoning, rather than predefined 
objects. Importantly, this authority is a sign of our freedom of mind and of our 
rationality.28 We are free in that we take responsibility for the making of our cognitive 
attitudes.29 We are rational because we form our cognitive attitudes so that they are 
responsive to the reasons that justify having them, that is, to the evidence concerning the 
objects of such attitudes. Exercising authority, therefore, is not engaging in unrestrained 
deliberation. It is, instead, engaging in deliberation that is subject to the demands of 
reason.30 True, when exercising authority over our beliefs we take it upon ourselves to 
make up our mind as to what to believe. However, there is so much we can do in terms 
of making up our mind: we cannot decide to believe in what we want, because by their 
nature beliefs are a reflection of the evidence of which we are aware.31 More precisely, 
they directly reflect the reasons that we read into such evidence. Therefore, our cognitive 
freedom may only reside in the consideration and assessment of the available evidence in 
order to discover its significance.32 Beliefs directly follow from this interpretive task. This 
                                                        
26 Moran, supra note 25 at 62-63. 
27 See id. at 124-134. 
28 See id. at 64, 84, 127, 151. 
29 Cf. S. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual (Harper and Row, 1965) at 93-94, and 112. 
30 Cf. Moran, supra note 25 at 127, stating: “The stance from which a person speaks with any special 
authority about his belief is … the stance from which one declares the authority of reason over one’s 
belief.” 
31 This property of beliefs is often referred to as ‘truth-directedness’ and expressed with the metaphor 
according to which beliefs ‘aim’ at the truth of their object. See B. Williams, ‘Deciding to Believe’ in 
Problems of the Self (CUP, 1973) at 136, 137; D. J. Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Clarendon 
Press, 2000) at 251. Cf. P. Noordhof, ‘Believe What You Want’ (2001) 101 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 247 at 255–264. 
32 Gathering the evidence is best characterized as a possible expression of our freedom of action, rather 
than of our cognitive freedom. 
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is why I take this task to be the kernel of the idea of exercising authority over our beliefs. 
It is through – gathering and, in particular, through – interpreting the evidence that we 
can tease out the relevant reasons and exercise as much control as possible over our 
beliefs. 
In light of the above explanation we can appreciate that authority comes in degrees.  
Normally we exercise authority over our beliefs. However, there are cases where we 
seem to abdicate part of our authority. We may not go as far as taking a theoretical stance 
towards our beliefs, but certainly we do not engage in a fully-fledged deliberation on 
what we are to believe, that is, we do not consider and assess carefully the available 
evidence concerning the object of our beliefs. We simply rely on beliefs that we already 
have, possibly after a cursory check of some of the reasons that justify having them. 
Often we take this avenue for the sake of expediency. Since we do not have the 
opportunity to deliberate every time on all the beliefs that we act upon, we treat some of 
our beliefs as settled. E.g., I call into the grocery store on my way home. I remember that 
this morning I did not see any flour in the cupboard. It is possible that my girlfriend 
bought some during the day, given that we had a plan of baking pizza for supper. It 
would be impractical for me to go home to find out – and even if I bought some 
unnecessary flour it would not be such a big deal. Thus, I act based on my morning belief 
that there is no flour in the cupboard and go on to buy some. At other times, our 
avoiding fully-fledged deliberation may show idleness. Even in the absence of time 
pressure we cannot bother considering evidence that may change our beliefs or our 
assumptions. E.g., I form a belief on a scholarly debate after reading a couple of articles 
while preparing for a class. I know that there is much more material written on the topic 
and I know that reading it may influence my belief. However, I am content with my 
belief for the time being. Moreover, we may avoid deliberation because of 
overconfidence. E.g. I have just moved to a new area of London and a few days ago I 
spent some time on Google Maps finding out the best bicycle route to get to my 
workplace. I believe that the route crosses Finsbury Park on the west side and then turns 
left onto Finsbury Park Road. Giving the route another quick check before the ride would 
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certainly help. But I am confident that I know my way. In fact, I get lost. On yet other 
occasions, we may evade deliberation because of a bias in favour of maintaining a 
particular belief and, therefore, a resistance against changing it.33 E.g., I am a fervent 
supporter of a certain political party, which may bring me to ignore evidence of 
corruption of party members and simply to adhere to a previously formed belief in the 
integrity of the party. 
Expediency, idleness, overconfidence, and bias34 lead us to relinquish authority over 
our cognitive attitudes, to the extent that we may come to see them in a fashion that is 
similar to that in which the individual taking a theoretical stance sees them: as given 
objects that we ascertain – through finding them in our mind – rather than constitute. It is 
evident that every departure from a full exercise of authority involves the risk that our 
cognitive attitudes depart from the reality of their objects. This is because the equivalence 
between the question ‘do I believe that p?’ and the question ‘is p true?’ – which is typical 
of the deliberative stance – is partially lost. We gradually pay less attention to the 
existence of reasons that justify believing that something is the case. We put less care in 
our consideration and assessment of the available evidence, so that our – already limited 
– control on belief formation is diminished.  
The upshot of this discussion is that exercising authority over our cognitive attitudes is 
an epistemic virtue:35 those who care about the justification of their beliefs and seek 
knowledge must not evade deliberation on what they are to believe. Doing otherwise 
would be irrational, because it would make our beliefs less responsive to the reasons that 
justify having them. As was hinted above – consider the grocery store example – 
                                                        
33  This last phenomenon is best known as ‘confirmation bias’. Cf. L. Bortolotti, Delusions and Other 
Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2010) at 140-143. 
34 I am advancing no claim that the list is exhaustive. In fact, the list of possible epistemic vices (and of the 
respective virtues) is much longer. However, I consider these to be the vices that are more likely to affect 
criminal fact finding. Therefore, I concentrate on them only. 
35 It should come as no surprise that a virtue epistemologist lists among the epistemic virtues abilities that 
counter the four – potentially disrupting – factors discussed above and that, therefore, can be understood 
as establishing one’s authority over her cognitive attitudes. See W. J. Wood, Epistemology: Becoming 
Intellectually Virtuous (InterVarsity Press, 1998), in particular, Ch. 2 and 3. In light of this, one may argue 
that exercising authority is an overarching epistemic virtue, which includes other, more basic, virtues. 
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sometimes we may have countervailing reasons to relinquish (part of) our authority and 
simply to rely on pre-existing beliefs or assumptions. 36  However, when our task is 
precisely that of establishing whether a certain fact is true, reason favours the exercise of 
authority. If fact finding is our primary goal, we should guard against expediency, 
idleness, overconfidence or bias. 
While certain factors may lower the degree of our authority, other factors may 
enhance it. After all, although I consider myself a reasonably skilled fact finder, I 
certainly lack the ability and determination of Sherlock Holmes in forming beliefs that 
reflect the available evidence. He generally displays a higher authority over his beliefs 
than I do over mine, in the sense that he exercises more care in the investigative process 
and, especially, in the process of interpreting the evidence. As a result, his beliefs 
represent the reality of their objects better than mine do.37 What are, then, the factors that 
enhance the degree of authority? The list may be long. Here I want to focus only on two 
cognitive operations that concern the process of drawing inferences – i.e., the making of a 
judgment concerning the occurrence of a fact based on a judgment concerning the 
occurrence of another fact. It is well appreciated that inferential reasoning lies at the heart 
of fact finding. 38  Drawing inferences is the bread and butter of the fact finder: for 
instance, it is through an inference that the fact finder uses the demeanour of a witness to 
determine her reliability and uses a DNA match to determine whether the defendant was 
at the scene of the crime. In a previous article39 I have attempted to define the structure of 
factual inferences and to isolate the fundamental operations that a reasoner should 
perform when determining whether fact b can be inferred from a given fact a. For present 
purposes I will concentrate on two of these operations only. Take a certain fact a. We 
                                                        
36 However, while under certain circumstances it is possible to justify departures from authority that are 
due to expediency, it is harder to justify a departure produced, for instance, by bias. 
37 I admit that this is a strange comment to make on a fictional character! 
38 Cf. P. Roberts & C. Aitken, The Logic of Forensic Proof: Inferential Reasoning in Criminal Evidence and 
Forensic Science. The Royal Statistical Society: Practitioner Guide No. 3, at 12-15, available at 
http://www.rss.org.uk/uploadedfiles/userfiles/files/Forensic-Proof-contents.pdf (last accessed on 6 
November 2014). 
39 F. Picinali, “Structuring Inferential Reasoning in Criminal Fact Finding: an Analogical Theory” (2012) 11 
Law, Probability & Risk 197. 
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want to determine whether fact b can be inferred from a. We have information – be it a 
scientific law or a commonsense generalisation – stating a correlation between a and b. 
The accuracy of the inference will depend on the strength of the correlation – i.e., what is 
often referred to as the ‘evidential strength’ of a vis-á-vis b – and on the reliability of the 
information concerning such correlation, that is, on the reliability of the scientific law or 
commonsense generalisation. Thus, when we deliberate on whether (it is justified) to 
draw the inference, we must assess each of these variables. In our everyday reasoning we 
seldom pause to undertake these operations. When addressing the question (as to what 
we are to believe) concerning the occurrence of b, we may not take the trouble to assess 
carefully evidential strength and reliability. If we do it at all, we may do so swiftly,40 just 
relying on some of the easily accessible reasons in favour or against believing in the 
occurrence of b. Often this is because we do not care much whether we get it right or not: 
we are under the pressure of more important issues. However, if our primary task is to 
find out whether b is the case, our authority over our beliefs should be exercised to a 
higher degree. This is done precisely through a thorough assessment of evidential 
strength and reliability. If we are taking our task seriously we should perform these two 
operations with care, irrespective of whether we are addressing the question on the 
occurrence of b for the first time or we are testing a belief on whether b occurred, that we 
have previously formed. 
 
 
5.Reasonable doubt and the virtue of authority  
There is a twofold link between BRD and the intellectual virtue consisting in exercising 
authority over our beliefs. That BRD requires the exercise of authority on the part of the 
fact finder is made evident by its clear reference to the reasons – for and – against the 
hypothesis of guilt. Contrary to what several instructions on BRD assume, the focus of 
the formula is not on defining the cognitive attitude that the fact finder must possess for 
                                                        
40 And, possibly, only at the subconscious level. 
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a finding of guilt.41 It is, instead, on requiring the presence of reasons to justify such a 
finding, where these reasons are provided by the pieces of evidence pertaining to the 
case. When the fact finder has to determine whether BRD is met, she should not limit 
herself to ascertaining – as if from a ‘theoretical’ stance – whether she has a particular 
cognitive attitude on the matter at issue.42 The fact finder must, instead, heed the reasons 
for and against holding true the object of such attitudes, that is, for and against endorsing 
the attitude itself. In other words, she must take it upon herself to assess the available 
evidence so as to make the attitude responsive to it. Now, if BRD requires that the fact 
finder’s beliefs are responsive to the reasons made available during the trial, it derives 
that the fact finder should pay particular attention not to fall prey to the factors that 
compromise such responsiveness: expediency – and more importantly – idleness, 
overconfidence, and bias. 
Not only does BRD invite the fact finder to engage with the evidence; it also indicates 
what procedure should the fact finder follow in her interpretive endeavours. It does so 
through the concept of ‘doubt’. This concept tallies with the procedure of hypothesis 
testing discussed by Roberts and Zuckerman.43 To doubt a hypothesis is to question it 
and, more generally, to scrutinise and assess it. Famously, Descartes conceived of 
doubting not merely as an outward method used by the individual to test assertions 
proffered by someone else, but chiefly as an inward strategy directed at testing our own 
beliefs. In any case, doubting requires the adoption of an active, deliberative stance 
towards statements of fact. The previous discussion of authority provides important 
guidance for devising the test to which the hypothesis of guilt should be put. The 
                                                        
41 Cf. Laudan, supra note 9 at 79-81. Consider also Laudan’s reflections at 53-54 on the need for an 
evidence-centred, rather than an attitude-centred standard of proof. 
42 This should hold true irrespective of whether someone contends that verdicts should express the fact 
finder’s attitude of belief in a statement of fact or that they should express the fact finder’s attitude of 
acceptance of such a statement. It is my view that verdicts should express a particular belief of the fact 
finder. For more details see Picinali, supra note 15 at 868-869. Laurence Cohen argues, instead, that 
verdicts should express the (conative) attitude of acceptance. See L. J. Cohen, “Should a Jury Say What it 
Believes or What it Accepts?” (1991) 13 Cardozo Law Review 465. However, he recognizes that beliefs do 
play an “important role within the structure of courtroom thinking”, given that “belief is the appropriate 
attitude towards the data”, that is, the items of evidence on which the verdict is based (at 475). 
43 See supra section 3. 
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prosecution’s case is made of a series of inferences, some of which are explicitly 
addressed, some of which are left implicit. In making up her mind as to whether any of 
these inferences is properly drawn – and, thus, whether the factum probandum is to be 
believed in light of the available evidence – the fact finder must test the evidential 
strength and the reliability of the inference.44 She must focus on the correlation between 
the facts involved in the inference, as well as on the reliability of the information 
concerning such correlation. Thus, if an expert claims that there is a match between an 
ear-print found at the scene of the crime and the print of the defendant’s ear,45 the fact 
finder is not to infer that the defendant was at the scene of the crime before assessing 
carefully, on the one hand, the strength of the correlation between the presence of a 
match and the fact that the two prints come from the same source – in other words, how 
likely is it that the source is the defendant, given the match; on the other hand, the 
reliability of the information used and provided by the expert with regard to both the 
presence of the match and the correlation. 
BRD demands a particular method of reasoning, whereby the fact finder is to exercise 
a high degree of authority over her beliefs. This means that the fact finder must heed the 
reasons that justify having a certain cognitive attitude concerning a relevant fact, rather 
than merely ascertain and report that she has said attitude – as she would likely do, were 
she to fall pray to one of the aforementioned epistemic vices. The strategy that BRD 
requires for the justification of one’s attitude consists in testing the attitude through 
assessing the evidential strength and the reliability of the inferences that lead to it.  
 
 
6.The virtuous fact finder 
In their seminal work on the jury, Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington mention the 
widespread conception according to which the ideal juror is “a relatively passive record-
                                                        
44 For an interesting discussion on what inferences within the prosecution case should be proved BRD see 
D. Hamer, “The Continuing Saga of the Chamberlain Direction: Untangling the Cables and Chains of 
Criminal Proof” (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 43. 
45 Cf. Dallagher [2002] EWCA Crim 1903. 
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keeper … who encodes the events of the trial verbatim.” 46 The view of the juror as a 
“tape recorder” 47  may be given two distinct interpretations. Neither of them is 
compatible with the proposed understanding of BRD as imposing a reasoning procedure 
inspired by the virtue of authority. 
According to a strict interpretation, the ideal juror simply exposes herself to the 
evidence, lets the evidence ‘impress’ a cognitive attitude in her mind, ascertains what this 
attitude is through adopting a theoretical stance, and reports on it in the verdict. As 
argued above, this passive approach is not sufficient for reasoning BRD. BRD demands 
that the fact finder be alert and intellectually active; ready to engage with the reasons 
represented by the evidence, in particular, through testing the inferences put forward at 
trial by the prosecution. Undoubtedly, a strict reading of the tape-recorder metaphor is at 
odds with this intellectual dynamism. 
Under a relaxed interpretation of the metaphor, the ideal juror merely records the 
evidence throughout the trial and abstains from deliberating on it until she retires into 
the jury room. Only at that point does she assess and test the available material, 
especially through an exchange with her fellow jurors. Some studies suggest that it is 
unrealistic to demand of jurors that they postpone any deliberation until the end of the 
trial.48 I add to this consideration that such a demand would be inconsistent with the 
proposed understanding of BRD. It is true that in order to gain a complete picture of the 
case the fact finder must wait until all the evidence has been presented. Also, some items 
of evidence may be appreciated only in conjunction with items that are subsequently 
offered. However, memory decay and the particular need to test the reliability of the 
sources of evidence – witnesses above all – advise that jurors start engaging individually 
with every item of evidence at the time of its first appearance at trial. This preliminary 
reflection does not undermine the usual requirement that jurors defer judgment of the 
                                                        
46 R. Hastie, S. D. Penrod & N. Pennington, Inside the Jury (Harvard University Press, 1983) at 18. 
47 Ibidem. 
48 See R. F. Forston, “Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication” (1975) Brigham Young University 
Law Review 601 at 621; Hastie et al., supra note 46 at 18-19; Kerr et al., supra note 6 at 283. Cf. V. L. Smith, 
“Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors’ Information Processing and Decision Making” (1991) 79 Journal 
of Applied Psychology 220 at 225-226. 
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overall case until all the evidence has been heard.49 In fact, the prompt and private 
consideration of the reasons at play can only promote effective collective deliberation at 
the end of the trial.50 
 
 
7.Instructing the fact finder on the virtue of reasoning BRD 
Even if an abstract definition of the threshold represented by BRD were achievable – and 
I believe it is – it would be difficult to guide jurors in the application of this threshold 
without interfering with their task – indeed, without usurping their role. As an 
alternative, I have suggested that BRD be interpreted as requiring also a particular 
method of reasoning. Jurors should behave as virtuous fact finders, thus testing their 
beliefs on the evidence through practising a particular intellectual virtue. This is the 
exercise of authority over their cognitive attitudes: rather than trusting their beliefs 
supinely and being seduced by epistemic vices, jurors are to engage alertly and critically 
with the evidence throughout the trial, identifying the reasons for and against the 
hypothesis of guilt. The virtue of authority is further clarified in terms of the test to 
which the inferences forming the hypothesis of guilt should be put. Jurors should assess 
the correlation between the facts involved in the inference as well as the reliability of the 
information concerning such correlation. It is by means of this reasoning process that 
reasonableness can be accurately ascribed to doubts on the hypothesis of guilt: the 
reasons supporting defensive doubts will emerge through testing evidential strength and 
reliability. Adherence to the suggested method of reasoning should, therefore, promote 
compliance with the threshold represented by BRD. 
                                                        
49 See the Crown Court Benchbook, supra note 1 at 387. 
50 Cf. this sample direction – formulated by Lord Lane in Watson [1988] QB 690 – on the contribution that 
individual jurors are expected to make to the collective deliberation: “Each of you has taken an oath to 
return a true verdict according to the evidence. No one must be false to that oath, but you have a duty not 
only as individuals but also collectively. That is the strength of the jury system. Each of you takes into the 
jury-box with you your individual experience and wisdom. Your task is to pool that experience and 
wisdom. You do that by giving your views and listening to the views of others. There must necessarily be 
discussion, argument and give and take within the scope of your oath. That is the way in which 
agreement is reached.” 
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At this point a critical reader may say: “Fair enough. You may have made a case for 
reading the virtue of authority into BRD. However, your discussion still leaves open the 
issue of determining ‘how much virtue’ the fact finder is to exercise, and of instructing 
her accordingly. What is the extent of consideration and assessment of the evidence that 
BRD requires? When should the fact finder be satisfied with her tests of evidential 
strength and reliability?” These are, again, problems of threshold determination, which 
seem to raise the very issue that my proposal intended to avoid: explaining to jurors the 
key concept of ‘reasonable doubt’. At a closer look, however, this criticism is less 
significant than it seems. It is true that jurors would receive better guidance were we able 
to indicate the ‘amount of virtue’ that they need to exercise. However, instructing them 
on the virtue of authority represents an important step forward with respect to the 
traditional threshold-centered instructions on BRD – as well as a possible method-
centered instruction along the lines of Roberts’s and Zuckerman’s conception of the 
standard. This is so for two related reasons. First, instructing jurors on the virtue of 
authority would give them useful directives on how to reason with the evidence, which 
they wouldn’t otherwise receive. It would tell jurors with a reasonable degree of detail 
what attitudes to avoid and what operations to undertake when testing the prosecution 
case. Second, the absence of precise information concerning the extent of authority that 
jurors are expected to practise would not compromise their understanding of the 
directives and the beneficial role that the directives are expected to play. In fact, I suspect 
that most people would have an intuitive grasp of what it means to avoid the 
aforementioned epistemic vices and to assess the reliability and strength of an inference. 
If they are carefully directed to do so, their performance as fact finders is only likely to 
improve, whether or not they are told precisely what degree of epistemic effort is 
required of them.51 
I appreciate that it may be complex and unnecessary to instruct jurors on the facets 
and the theoretical underpinnings of the virtue of authority. However, it is possible to 
                                                        
51 Cf. R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (OUP, 1999), Ch. 1. I concede that in order to strengthen this claim it 
would be advisable to subject it to empirical testing. The claim is reasonable nonetheless. 
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devise a clear and helpful instruction that mentions the threshold required by BRD, but 
then concentrates on the main traits of the reasoning method that was discussed so far. 
This instruction should include the points that follow, formulating them in the language 
that is most accessible to lay people.52 
 
1) The criminal standard of proof is BRD; 
2) The evidential threshold imposed by BRD is substantially higher than the 
threshold governing fact finding in civil cases, but it falls short of 
certainty;53 
3) In order to satisfy this stringent evidential threshold, BRD demands that 
jurors apply a particular method of reasoning, described in 5) and 6). Jurors 
should trust that adhering to this method will promote compliance with the 
threshold;  
4) Jurors should follow this method both individually – when they are 
hearing the evidence – and collectively – when they are deliberating on the 
case as a whole at the end of the trial; 
5) In general, jurors should exercise a high level of care and responsibility in 
fact finding; they should be alert and attentive to all the evidence presented 
at trial and their verdict should be responsive to such evidence; they should 
avoid hasty judgments on any relevant issue; they should be wary of the 
negative influence that biases and stereotypes may have on their 
deliberations; and they should be humble, that is, ready to change their 
minds when there are reasons to do so; 
6) More specifically, jurors should test the many inferences that are part of 
the prosecution case.54 A factual inference is the making of a judgment 
                                                        
52 I have already attempted to formulate the points in easy and intelligible terms. 
53 Giving jurors a lower and a higher point of reference does help them situate the threshold – albeit 
imprecisely. This definitional device is often used in directions on BRD. 
54  It is important to consider that also ordinary testimonies require that jurors draw an inference 
concerning the trustworthiness of the witness, i.e., the inference from the fact that the witness said ‘that p’ 
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concerning the occurrence of a fact based on a judgment concerning the 
occurrence of another fact. In order to test the inference, jurors must assess 
the strength of the correlation between the two facts and the reliability of 
the information expressing such correlation. ‘Correlation’ should be defined 
as the extent to which the occurrence of a fact is indicative of the occurrence 
of another fact. In light of the assessments of evidential strength and 
reliability, jurors should ask themselves whether there are reasons to doubt 
that the inference could be drawn. If there are, they should not draw the 
inference. It may be helpful to offer a straightforward example of this test, 
along the lines of the ear-print case discussed above.55 
 
I trust that an instruction along these lines would constitute a decisive improvement on 
the current directions on the standard of proof. True, as with current directions and with 
a hypothetical direction on eliminative reasoning, the proposed instruction may still 
leave jurors to wonder about the meaning and application of the concept of ‘reasonable 
doubt’. However – as argued above – it has the advantage of providing a more 
intelligible conceptual framework and a set of practicable directives that would 
substantially contribute to jurors’ understanding and performance of their task and, as a 
result, to the quality of fact finding. Still, someone may contend that these directives are 
superfluous in that they are restatements of commonsensical recommendations of which 
jurors are already aware. I agree that the directives are commonsensical, if with this term 
we refer to the property of commanding assent from a reasonable person. However, I 
                                                                                                                                                                        
to the occurrence of p. The correlation between these facts is expressed by common-sense generalisations 
reflecting the characteristics of the witness or by empirical studies. The reliability of this information is to 
be assessed. 
55 A possible example not involving expert evidence is the following. Consider that it is part of the 
prosecution case that the defendant’s intent to commit the crime should be inferred from the behaviour 
that she held in the days preceding the event. In deciding whether to draw the inference the fact finder 
should: (A) assess the extent to which this behaviour is indicative of the presence – at the relevant time – 
of the intention to commit the crime; and (B) ask herself whether she trusts the information concerning the 
relationship between these two facts (be it a common-sense generalisation and/or the words used by the 
prosecution when inviting the jury to draw the inference). 
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strongly doubt that every juror is already aware of them – especially of the test discussed 
in 6) – and of the positive epistemic role that they are expected to play. Also, I doubt that 
those who are already aware of these directives would always attempt to put them into 
practice even in the absence of an apposite invitation to do so. 
For the proposed instruction to perform its beneficial function, however, it would 
have to be imparted within the introductory speech of the judge at the commencement of 
trial56 and, possibly, repeated before the jury retires for deliberation. In fact, if jurors are 
to start applying the suggested reasoning procedure already when the evidence is first 
introduced, they must be informed on the nature of such procedure before the 
prosecution presents its case. Later repetition of the instruction would refresh its message 
in the jurors’ mind before the crucial phase of collective deliberation. Aside from these 
considerations, the need for a pre-instruction on BRD is further supported by empirical 
studies showing that pre-instructions can be more effective than traditional directions.57 
This is especially the case when the instruction is repeated at the end of the trial.58 
Consider the words written long ago by a judge of the United States Court of Appeals. 
Not only do they advance a convincing argument for a pre-instruction on BRD; they also 
touch on the importance of putting jurors in the condition to reason carefully about the 
evidence – I would add: as BRD requires! 
 
[I]t makes no sense to have a juror listen to days of testimony only then to be told that he 
and his confreres are the sole judges of the facts, that the accused is presumed to be 
innocent, that the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, etc. What 
                                                        
56 Consider the words of the Crown Court Benchbook, supra note 1 at 1: “The more we focus upon jurors’ 
needs in the management and conduct of trials, and in summing up, the better able the jury will be to 
perform their task accurately and confidently … The first responsibility of the trial judge, we propose, is to 
assist each member of the jury to understand and perform his or her duty to return a true verdict 
according to the evidence. That responsibility includes ensuring that jurors quickly become acclimatized 
to the courtroom and to the business of trial. Much can be achieved by introductory, explanatory and reassuring 
words at the outset” (emphasis added). 
57 See S. M. Kassin & L. S. Wrightsman, “On the Requirements of Proof: The Timing of Judicial Instruction 
and Mock Juror Verdicts” (1979) 37 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1877; L. Heuer & S. D. 
Penrod, “Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with Written and Preliminary Instructions” (1989) 13 Law 
and Human Behavior 409. 
58 See Smith, supra note 48. 
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manner of mind can go back over a stream of conflicting statements of alleged facts, recall 
the intonations, the demeanor, or even the existence of the witnesses, and retrospectively 
fit all these recollections into a pattern of evaluation and judgment given him for the first 
time after the events? The human mind cannot do so. It is not a magnetized tape from 
which recorded speech can be repeated at chosen speed and volume. The fact of the matter 
is that this order of procedure makes much of the trial of a lawsuit mere mumbo jumbo. It 
sounds all right to the professional technicians who are the judge and the lawyers. It reads 
all right to the professional technicians who are the court of appeals. But to the laymen 
sitting in the box, restricted to listening, the whole thing is a fog.59 
 
 
8.A concluding remark 
I have argued that we should construe BRD as requiring (also) a method of reasoning 
and that we should instruct jurors accordingly. I have made a suggestion as to what this 
method of reasoning should be, providing a theoretical as well as textual basis for my 
claim. No doubt some readers will have misgivings about the details of my argument. 
However, I trust that this paper has at least sensitised the audience to two claims. The 
general claim is that jurors need to be afforded more guidance on how to reason about 
the evidence. More work must be done in this direction and I believe that a new 
reflection on BRD is a promising starting point. The particular claim is that the Crown 
Court Benchbook’s ‘be sure of guilt’ instruction is not a step forward in this direction. 
Jurors may understand the instruction as an invitation to take a theoretical stance, that is, 
merely to ascertain their cognitive attitude concerning guilt and to reflect this attitude in 
the verdict. The instruction in itself does not focus jurors’ attention on the need for their 
attitude to be responsive to the available evidence, and it does not give jurors any 
guidance as to how to promote this responsiveness. 
                                                        
59 E. B. Prettyman, “Jury Instructions: First or Last?” (1960) 46 American Bar Association Journal 1066, 
cited in Forston, supra note 48 at 621. 
 
